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Abstract
Past and recent events have shown that railway infrastructure systems are particu-
larly vulnerable to natural catastrophes, unintentional accidents and terrorist attacks.
Protection investments are instrumental in reducing economic losses and preserving
public safety. A systematic approach to plan security investments is paramount to
guarantee that limited protection resources are utilized in the most efficient manner.
In this article, we present an optimization model to identify the railway assets which
should be protected to minimize the impact of worst case disruptions on passenger
flows. We consider a dynamic investment problem where protection resources become
available over a planning horizon. The problem is formulated as a bilevel mixed-integer
model and solved using two different decomposition approaches. Random instances of
different sizes are generated to compare the solution algorithms. The model is then
tested on the Kent railway network to demonstrate how the results can be used to
support efficient protection decisions.
Keywords. Strategic planning, transportation, protection, bilevel programming, decompo-
sition.
1 Introduction
Nowadays the social well-being of people highly relies on the well functioning of critical
interconnected infrastructures such as transportation, information, telecommunication, and
electric power systems. Planning and protecting infrastructure systems is a complex task,
especially because of their dimension and interdependence. Even small random disruptions
can severely affect the normal functioning of one or more infrastructure. Intelligent attacks
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or large natural catastrophes can have even more dramatic consequences in terms of both
economic and life losses. Examples of such events include the 1995 Paris metro bombing,
the 2004 Madrid train bombing, the 2005 London underground suicide attacks, and the 2010
Moscow bombing. Most recently, severe floods hit some western regions of the UK and
forced the Network Rail to pay £12.5m for the suppressed services and further £15m to
repair the infrastructure (Wintour and Topham, 2014). It is therefore paramount to protect
infrastructure systems so that continuity in service provision and safety for the users can be
guaranteed, even when disruptions occur.
A critical aspect in planning infrastructure protection is the scarce availability of protec-
tion resources. Protecting all the components of an infrastructure system to targeted safety
levels may in fact be cost prohibitive. For example, the Kent (UK) railway system serves 179
stations and has 1094 miles of tracks. Protecting every station and all the tracks is econom-
ically impossible. Another complicating factor in protecting railways is that they are open
and easily accessible systems. This renders them highly vulnerable to all kinds of disruption
and requires careful identification of suitable protection measures. These may include the
structural reinforcement of vulnerable parts (tunnels and bridges), video surveillance of crit-
ical areas (crosses, stations) and the use of a wide range of sensors to detect intrusions and
obstacles on tracks. Since resources are limited, it is important to identify and protect the
most critical assets of the infrastructure.
In recent years, several mathematical models have been developed to identify systems’
vulnerabilities and plan protection strategies for critical infrastructures. Predominantly, in-
terdiction and protection of infrastructure systems have been modelled using multi-level op-
timization. Multi-level optimization models represent an effective tool to “model a complete
infrastructure system and its value to society, including how losses of the system’s assets re-
duce that value, or how improvements in the system mitigate lost value”(Brown et al., 2006).
These models are also referred to as defender-attacker models since they emulate the game
between two actors with opposite aims. The defender’s aim is to distribute limited defence
resources so as to minimize the effects of a worst case disruption. On the other hand, the
attacker’s aim is to choose the attack plan which minimizes the system’s value (or maximize
the system’s cost). The attacker is an intelligent actor who has perfect knowledge of the
system and is always able to inflict the maximum damage. In other words, he is a proxy to
model worse-case disruptions. Clearly this kind of models are very useful to simulate terrorist
attacks and intentional disruptions. Nonetheless, given the criticality of infrastructure sys-
tems, protection efforts are often guided by risk-averse decision making criteria, thus making
these models extremely valuable also for problems involving natural catastrophes.
A third actor, referred to as the system user, is often used in multi-level models to
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evaluate the system’s value after protection and interdiction. Bilevel attacker-user models
are typically used to identify the vulnerabilities of a system, by highlighting the outcomes of a
worst-case interdiction. Trilevel defender-attacker-user models are typically used to identify
the system’s components that should be hardened or protected. Sometimes the models
mirroring the actions of the attacker and the system user can be collapsed into a single
model (Church et al., 2004, Losada et al., 2012a), so that a single level model can represent
an interdiction problem whereas a bilevel model can represent a protection problem.
The main contribution of this paper is to study a dynamic network protection problem.
The model we present is quite general and, albeit designed for railway infrastructures, can be
applied in other contexts as well. The model aims at distributing protection resources among
the assets of a railway system so as to maximise its survivability after a worst case disruption.
Generally, survivability can be described as “the capability of a system to fulfill its mission,
in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents”(Ellison et al., 1997).
According to the specific context, network survivability can be measured using different
metrics. For instance, for shortest-path based problems, the length of a path is the key
measure to assess whether a network is vulnerable and reliable. To evaluate survivability, we
use the same metric introduced by Myung and Kim (2004), Murray et al. (2007), Matisziw and
Murray (2009) and Scaparra et al. (2015). In these works, network survivability is measured
in terms of lost or unserved system flow. In our model, the flow between an origin and a
destination node is considered lost if after a disruption affecting some network components,
the two nodes are no longer connected or they are connected but the post-disruption service
is significantly deteriorated (i.e., alternative routes are too long from a user’s perspective).
In this case, in fact, rail network users may abandon the trip or resort to another mode of
transport.
An important issue that should be taken into account when modelling protection efforts
is that protection resources usually become available at different times. Our model addresses
this issue by including a temporal component whereby the available budget for protection
is spread over a planning horizon. This choice renders the model more applicable to real
situations. In fact, public expenditures to protect and modernize critical infrastructures
are usually set in spending reviews that cover a number of years. For instance, the last
UK spending review (HM Treasury, 2013) allocated £100bn for the modernisation of the
energy and transportation sectors. This budget is spread over a five-year period (2015-2020).
Similarly, after the 2013-2014 floods in the UK, £130m were allocated by the government
to repair flood defences. Of the whole budget, £30m were made available in 2014, the rest
in 2015 (Carrington and Weaver, 2014). In addition, the UK Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) set out a six-year programme of capital investment to
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improve flood defences up to 2021, of £2.3bn. Fixed capital settlements were allocated
for each year, although flexibility to move funds between years was allowed for effective
delivery (DEFRA, 2015). These examples demonstrate that funds availability is often time-
related. Consequently, prioritizing expenditures over time is key to the development of long-
term, effective strategies for improving infrastructure’s security and resiliency. To respond
to the practical planning needs of railway stakeholders and operators, we therefore propose
a protection model that optimizes the allocation of scarce protection resources over time.
Our model builds upon and extends the static protection model proposed by Scaparra et
al. (2015) by considering dynamic investments. The model has a bilevel structure where the
aim of the upper level is to find the best allocation of protection resources over a planning
horizon so as to minimize the amount of disrupted flow. The lower level is used to evaluate
worse case losses in each time period in response to a given protection plan. The resulting
multi-period bilevel model is significantly more difficult to solve than its static counterpart.
To find optimal solutions to problem instances of realistic size, we propose two decomposition
approaches tailored to the dynamic structure of the model and test them on a set of new,
randomly generated instances. Given that the multi-period structure of the model can lead to
solve the same lower level program multiple times in our iterative approaches, we streamline
the algorithms by using efficient data structures, thus avoiding recomputing solutions already
found. The use of this expedient proved to be extremely efficient and on some preliminary
tests reduced the overall computing time of the decomposition methods by as much as 80%.
Finally, some practical insights, including an analysis of dynamic investments, are discussed
for a real network representing the railway infrastructure of Kent (UK).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 provides a review of the
literature related to this work. In Sec. 3, the bilevel formulation of DNP is introduced. Sec.
4 provides a description of the decomposition algorithms. In Sec. 5, we report computational
results on two sets of random problems, while the results on the Kent case study are analysed
in Sec. 6. Some conclusive remarks are discussed in Sec. 7.
2 Background
Since the seminal paper of Wollmer (1964), several papers have appeared in the literature
which deal with network interdiction problems. The underlying idea of these models is to
find the critical arcs and/or nodes of a network. An element is critical if, after interdiction,
the performance of the network drops significantly. Therefore a key issue in these models is
to identify a suitable metric to evaluate network performance.
One stream of the literature has analysed the problem of finding the network components
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that, when interdicted, minimize the maximum flow between pairs of nodes (Wollmer, 1964).
Wood (1993) introduced an integer programming formulation for this problem and extended
the model by considering multiple resources and multiple commodities. Since real life in-
terdiction problems are intrinsically characterized by uncertainty (what will the interdicted
components be? when will they be interdicted? to what extent?), subsequent work has fo-
cused on problems including stochastic and probabilistic elements. For instance, Cormican
et al. (1998) proposed a stochastic model aiming at minimizing the expected maximum flow
on a network while taking into account that interdictions can be unsuccessful. They also con-
sidered further extensions in which arc capacities are random variables and multiple attacks
on the same arc can be attempted. Lim and Smith (2007) worked on a multi commodity
flow network, considering both discrete and continuous interdiction. Other recent network
flow interdiction models can be found in Afshari and Kakhki (2013), Altner et al. (2010),
and Royset and Wood (2007).
Another stream of the literature has focused on distance based networks. The models
developed in this framework aim at identifying the elements that, if disrupted, maximize
the distance, travel time or transportation cost between nodes. Fulkerson and Harding
(1977) studied the interdiction problem in a shortest path network using continuous variables.
Israeli and Wood (2002) formulated the same problem using binary interdiction variables and
introduced different solution approaches. Hemmecke et al. (2003) extended the problem to
stochastic networks. Bayrak and Bailey (2008) studied the asymmetric interdiction problem,
considering that the two actors have different levels of knowledge of the network.
A third stream has dealt with network connectivity. In these problems, the aim of the
interdictor is to use offensive resources in order to reduce connectivity. Grubesic et al.
(2008) used graph theory to assess network connectivity and vulnerability. Several metrics
to estimate the network connectivity have been proposed. Albert et al. (2000) used the
network diameter, Grubesic et al. (2003) the degree of a node. Shen et al. (2012) used three
different metrics: the number of connected components, the largest component size, and the
minimum cost required to reconnect the graph after the loss of some nodes.
Interdiction models are a useful tool to identify infrastructure vulnerabilities and critical
assets. However, protection decisions must be explicitly represented into a model to ensure
that the most efficient resource allocation is identified. In fact, choosing the elements to
protect from the interdiction set obtained by solving an attacker-user model may lead to
sub-optimal solutions (Church and Scaparra, 2007). The literature stream dealing with
protection models has mainly focused on facility protection in supply chain systems (Scaparra
and Church, 2008a, Liberatore and Scaparra, 2011, Liberatore et al., 2012, Losada et al.,
2012b, Bricha and Nourelfath, 2015). Only a few papers have dealt with protection issues
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in transportation networks. Cappanera and Scaparra (2011) analyzed a trilevel protection
problem to study the optimal allocation of protection resources in shortest path networks.
Yates and Sanjeevi (2013) studied a variation of the shortest path fortification problem where
the aim of the interdictor is to travel across a network towards a precise target without
being detected. The defender’s goal is to find the optimal allocation of protection devices
to detect the intrusions. Du and Peeta (2014) presented a stochastic model to identify the
optimal allocation of defense resources in order to minimise the post-disaster response time
of a transportation network. Talarico et al. (2015) proposed a model to allocate security
resources in a multi-level chemical transportation network.
If we narrow the focus to the railway context, the number of papers dealing with pro-
tection is quite limited. Peterson and Church (2008) introduced a framework to assess the
vulnerability of rail networks and apply it to the State of Washington infrastructure. Laporte
et al. (2010) proposed a model to design a robust railway transit network maximizing its min-
imum utility (e.g., trip coverage) when one link can fail. This model was later extended by
Perea and Puerto (2013).
The allocation of defensive and offensive resources over time has recently been analysed by
a few researchers within a game theoretic framework. The majority of these models focused
on the protection and disruption of a single target. For example, Levitin and Hausken
(2010) proposed a defender-attacker model where the attacker can launch sequential attacks.
Hausken and Zhuang (2011a) considered a government-terrorist game over multiple time
periods, where the terrorist can stockpile its resources for later attacks and the government
can allocate resources for defending the asset or attack the terrorist’s resources. Other single-
asset sequential defender-attacker problems can be found in Hausken and Zhuang (2011b),
Hausken and Zhuang (2012), and Levitin and Hausken (2012a). A multiple-target version of
these problems has been considered in Levitin and Hausken (2009), who studied the problem
of protecting identical elements in a parallel system against two sequential attacks. Levitin
and Hausken (2012b) extended this model by including the possibility of imperfect detection
of the first attack outcomes. In Levitin and Hausken (2013) both the attacker and the
defender can stockpile their resources over a planning horizon. Note that the game-theoretic
approach used in this literature stream is quite different from our approach in that the
problems are represented as a two-stage game and require a closed-form analytic solution
for the identification of Nash equilibria. These solutions cannot always be easily identified
and, consequently, the application of these models is often limited to simple problems (i.e.,
small systems or problems with a single target or only two time periods). On the contrary,
our proposed approaches, based on the use of sophisticated decomposition techniques for
solving mixed-integer bilevel programs, are able to solve problems where all of the network
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components (nodes and arcs) can be protected and interdicted, the planning horizon can
include several time periods, and the networks have realistic sizes.
3 The Dynamic Network Protection Problem (DNP)
We consider an undirected graph G = (N,A) representing the transportation network. In a
railway network, the nodes represent the stations and the arcs are the tracks connecting the
nodes. Assumptions, parameters and decision variables are introduced below:
(a) The problem is studied over a planning horizon represented by the set T = {0, 1, ..., Tˆ}.
(b) Interdiction is complete (i.e., an interdicted component is completely unusable in the
time period when interdiction takes place).
(c) A protected element becomes completely immune to interdiction. Therefore the same
element does not need to be protected more than once in the planning horizon. Both
arcs and nodes can be disrupted and protected. This assumption is made to contemplate
the possibility of disruptions of tracks, tunnels, bridges and stations at the same time.
(d) Each element has a different protection cost and there is a limited protection budget
in each time period. Any unutilized budget can be carried forward to the next time
period.
(e) In each time period, interdiction resources are limited and the amount of resources
needed to disrupt a component varies according to the component size and topology.
(f) In case of disruption, system users are willing to use alternative paths to reach their
destinations only if they are not significantly longer than their shortest route. We refer
to these alternative routes as acceptable paths. All the paths that establish connectivity
between two nodes s and d are computed in a preprocessing phase. The paths that are
too long from a user perspective are then removed from further considerations. This
evaluation is done by comparing each path with the shortest one: all paths exceeding
a given length threshold are discarded.
(g) The daily traffic flow between any two nodes is known with certainty and the flow
matrix is symmetric.
The bilevel model for DNP uses the following notation.
Indices, sets and parameters
s ∈ N : index used for flow sources.
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d ∈ N : index used for flow destinations.
i ∈ N : index used for network nodes.
j ∈ A : index used for network arcs.
t, u ∈ T : index used for time periods.
fsd : traffic demand between s and d.
Nsd : set of acceptable paths that connect s and d.
r ∈ Nsd : index used for network paths.
N(r) : set of nodes along path r.
A(r) : set of arcs along path r.
qt : cumulative protection budget available up to period t.
pt : amount of interdiction resources in period t.
qni : estimate of the amount of resources needed to protect node i.
pni : estimate of the amount of resources needed to disrupt node i.
qaj : estimate of the amount of resources needed to protect arc j.
paj : estimate of the amount of resources needed to disrupt arc j.
λt : weight used in the objective function to give different importance to the time periods.
Decision variables
Xnit = 1 if node i is disabled in period t; 0 otherwise.
Xajt = 1 if arc j is disabled in period t; 0 otherwise.
Y nit = 1 if node i is protected in period t; 0 otherwise.
Y ajt = 1 if arc j is protected in period t; 0 otherwise.
Zsdt = 1 if the flow between s and d is unserved in period t; 0 otherwise.
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s.t. Xnit ≤ 1−
t∑
u=1




















Xajt ≥ Zsdt ∀s, d ∈ N, r ∈ Nsd,∀t ∈ T (9)
Xnit ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N,∀t ∈ T (10)
Xajt ∈ {0, 1} ∀j ∈ A, ∀t ∈ T (11)
Zsdt ∈ {0, 1} ∀s, d ∈ N,∀t ∈ T. (12)
In the bilevel model above, the leader seeks the optimal protection strategy to minimize
the function F (1), which represents the weighted sum of demand that cannot be served
after interdiction, over the planning horizon. Constraint (2) represents the budget limit:
the amount of resources utilized up to period t for nodes and arcs protection cannot exceed
the available cumulative budget qt. Constraints (3) and (4) are the binary requirements for
the protection variables. The lower level program (5)-(12) is the interdiction model. The
follower seeks the attack strategy that maximizes the overall amount of unserved demand
(5). Constraints (6) state that a node cannot be disrupted at period t, if it is protected in
the time window {1, ..., t}. Similarly, constraints (7) state that an arc cannot be disrupted
at period t, if it is protected in the time window {1, ..., t}. Constraints (8) set a limit on the
interdiction resources available in each time period. Constraints (9) state that the demand
between s and d is unserved in period t (Zsdt = 1), only if all the acceptable paths connecting
the two nodes are disrupted at period t. This occurs if at least one node or arc on each
path is disabled. Finally, constraints (10)-(12) enforce binary restrictions on the lower level
variables.
4 Solution methodology
Multi-level models are generally very difficult to solve. Hansen et al. (1992) proved that even
the simplest bilevel models, the ones with continuous variables on every level, are strongly
NP-hard. Several solution approaches have been studied in the literature, including both
heuristic techniques and exact methods. Examples of heuristic approaches can be found in
Aksen and Aras (2013), Aksen et al. (2013, 2014), Parvaresh et al. (2013). Exact meth-
ods can be broadly classified into reformulation, enumeration and decomposition methods
(Saharidis and Ierapetritou, 2009). Reformulation and enumeration techniques are usually
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only applicable to bilevel problems with linear lower level programs. A few exceptions to
this are the reformulation of the p-median interdiction problem with fortification (Scaparra
and Church, 2008b) and the implicit enumeration algorithm used to solve several protection-
interdiction problems (Cappanera and Scaparra, 2011, Liberatore et al., 2012). In general,
the most effective methods for tackling problems with discrete variables in both levels are
decomposition methods. These directly exploit the decomposable structure of the model and
solve a series of smaller sub-problems to find an overall optimal solution.
In this paper, we present two different decomposition approaches for DNP. The first
is based on the use of Benders cuts. Benders decomposition has been widely used in the
literature to deal with large-scale MILP problems (Benders, 1962). More recently, the use
of Benders-like decomposition algorithms has been extended to multi-level programs (Israeli
and Wood, 2002, O’Hanley and Church, 2011, Losada et al., 2012b). The second approach
utilizes special cutting planes known as Super Valid Inequalities (SVIs). An SVI is a cutting
plane that reduces the feasible region without excluding any optimal solution unless the
incumbent solution is itself optimal. SVIs were initially introduced by Israeli and Wood
(2002) to speed up a Benders decomposition approach. SVIs were also used explicitly as a
stand alone solution method in O’Hanley and Church (2011) and in Losada et al. (2012b).
In all our decomposition approaches, DNP is split into two connected subproblems referred
to as the Restricted Master Problem (RMP) and the SubProblem (SP). These subproblems are
solved alternatively until the algorithms converge to an optimal solution. The RMP entails
decisions about what to protect to thwart the most disruptive interdiction plans identified
in previous iterations. At each iteration, the most disruptive interdiction plan in response
to a given protection strategy is identified by solving SP, which is the interdiction problem
(5)-(12) with the protection variables fixed to the feasible values identified by the current
RMP’s solution. The solution to the SP is then used to generate either Benders or SVIs cuts
to be appended to the RMP and the process is iterated.
The description of the decomposition methods uses the following additional notation.
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ZˆwXˆw : SP’s optimal response plan given protection strategy Yˆw. This vector holds the
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Yˆ ajuw ∀j ∈ A,∀t ∈ T (15)
(8)− (12)
By solving this model to optimality, we obtain a feasible solution, [Yˆw, ZˆwXˆw], for DNP
and an upper bound to its objective. Additionally, the optimal response strategy Xˆw can be
used to generate cutting planes for the RMP, as described in the following sections.
4.1 Benders Decomposition (BND-D)
The Benders decomposition algorithm uses the following additional notation.
artw : number of different elements along path r which are interdicted at time t in the
interdiction plan identified at iteration w.
Z¯w = {(s, d, t) ∈ N ×N × T | Zsdtw = 1}: indices of the disrupted flows at iteration w.
Qrtw : binary variable which takes value 1 if the interdiction of path r at time t in iteration
w is thwarted; 0 otherwise.
Qsdtw : binary variable which takes value 1 if the interdiction of the flow from s to d at time
t in iteration w is thwarted; 0 otherwise.
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Qrtw ≥ Qsdtw ∀s ∈ N, d ∈ N, t ∈ T : (s, d, t) ∈ Z¯w,∀w ∈ [1, w¯] (19)
Qrtw ∈ {0, 1} ∀s ∈ N, d ∈ N, t ∈ T : (s, d, t) ∈ Z¯w,∀r ∈ Nsd, ∀w ∈ [1, w¯] (20)
Qsdtw ∈ {0, 1} ∀(s, d, t) ∈ Z¯w,∀w ∈ [1, w¯] (21)
z ∈ R+. (22)
The aim of the objective function (16) is to find the best protection strategy that thwarts
the interdiction plans identified in the previous iterations. Constraints (17) are called Ben-
ders cuts. They are lower bounds to the objective function z generated by all the interdiction
strategies found in the previous iterations. Constraints (18) represent the relationship be-
tween the variables Qrtw and the protection variables. Specifically, they state that a path r
connecting s and d can no longer be disrupted at time t by the interdiction strategy Xˆw (i.e.,
Qrtw = 1), if all its interdicted arcs and nodes are protected either at time t or in some time
period prior to t. Constraints (19) state that the interdiction of the flow between s and d at
time t in iteration w can be thwarted (i.e., Qsdtw = 1) only if the protection strategy thwarts
the interdiction of at least one acceptable path r connecting s and d at time t. If at least one
path is not disrupted, then the objective function pushes the variable Qsdtw to take value 1
and the flow fsd at time t is no longer considered unserved in (17). Finally, constraints (20)
and (21) represent the binary requirements for the variables Qrtw and Qsdtw and constraint
(22) states that variable z is a non negative real.
The pseudo-code of BND-D is displayed below.
Algorithm 1 Bender decomposition
Set w = 1, Yˆw = 0, Yopt = 0, zsup =∞ and zinf = −∞
MAINSTEP
Solve SP(Yˆw) to obtain ZˆwXˆw and the objective value zˆ
if zˆ < zsup then
zsup = zˆ and Yopt ← Yˆw
end if
if zsup − zinf = 0 then
goto TERMINATE
end if
w = w + 1
Solve RMP(w) to obtain Yˆw and zinf






The solution of the SP provides an upper bound to the DNP. Conversely, the solution of
the RMP is a lower bound for the DNP (the RMP is in fact a relaxation of DNP as it only
includes a subset of all possible interdiction plans). When the two sub-problems have the
same objective function value, the algorithm stops. It is easy to prove that BND-D converges
in a finite number of iterations. The resource constraints, in fact, guarantee that the number
of interdiction and protection strategies is finite.
4.2 SVI Decomposition (SVI-D)
The basic idea behind this approach is that, to thwart a worst-case interdiction and hence
lower the objective function value of the follower, the protection strategy must include at
least one element belonging to the optimal interdiction set (Church and Scaparra, 2007). Our
SVIs embed this idea by enforcing the protection of at least one of the arcs or one of the
nodes interdicted in the current follower response Xˆw. More specifically, the SVI generated





















Y aju ≥ 1. (23)
This inequality states that at least one interdicted component in Xˆw must be protected,
either at time t or in a previous time period.
At each iteration w, the RMP for SVI-D is simply a feasibility seeking problem, including
constraints (2) − (4) and all the SVIs generated up to the current iteration. If a feasible
solution to the RMP can be identified, SP is solved again with the new protection strategy
Yˆw as input and the process is repeated. The algorithm stops when in the master model
the protection resources are insufficient to thwart all the interdiction strategies discovered
in the previous iterations, and thus the RMP becomes infeasible. Considering that the
protection and interdiction resources are limited, the number of possible strategies is finite.
Consequently, the RMP will become infeasible after a finite number of iterations.
The fact that inequalities (23) are supervalid is proven in the following proposition.
Proposition. SV I(Xˆw) is supervalid.
Proof. : Let [Yˆw, ZˆwXˆw] be the feasible solution of DNP found at iteration w. If this
solution is optimal, then by definition inequality (23) is super-valid. If the solution is sub-
optimal, adding inequality (23) to the RMP problem will generate a new protection strategy
Yˆw+1 6= Yˆw. This strategy will in turn lead to a solution Zˆw+1Xˆw+1 of the SP that is
different from the previous one because of constraints (14) and (15). Thus, for every w, the
13
inequality is super-valid because it eliminates the incumbent solution, i.e.:
[Yˆw+1, Zˆw+1Xˆw+1] 6= [Yˆw, ZˆwXˆw]. 2
The main steps of the SVI-D algorithm are outlined below:
Algorithm 2 SVI-D
Set w = 1, Yˆw = 0, Yopt = 0, zopt =∞.
MAINSTEP
Solve SP(Yˆw) to obtain ZˆwXˆw and the objective value zˆ
if zˆ < zopt then
zopt = zˆ and Yopt ← Yˆw.
end if
Add SV I(Xˆw) to RMP .
w = w + 1
Solve RMP to obtain Yˆw.





5 Results and Analysis
In this section, we investigate the computational efficiency of solving the dynamic network
protection problem using BND-D and SVI-D. Both algorithms were implemented in C and
run on a 64-bit machine with a quad-core 3.4GHz processor and 4GB of RAM. The Re-
stricted Master Problems and the SubProblems were solved using the IBM ILOG CPLEX
version 12.5 callable library. In our computational analysis, we set a time limit of 10, 000
seconds. In the algorithms’ implementation, we used specialized data structures to store and
retrieve information efficiently. Specifically, we observed that, given a protection strategy,
each SubProblem could be decomposed into |T | independent interdiction problems. Some of
these sub-problems recurred multiple times across different iterations. We therefore used a
hash table to store and retrieve their solutions efficiently. On some preliminary tests, this
expedient yielded a reduction in computing time as high as 80%.
The initial testing was performed on two sets of randomly generated problems. Specifi-
cally, we generated 5 undirected networks with 10 nodes and 15 arcs, and 5 undirected net-
works with 20 nodes and 25 arcs. Distances were chosen uniformly from the set {1, 2, ..., 6}.
The flow demand matrix was generated by drawing each value uniformly from {0, 1, ..., 100}.
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Each unit of flow can be interpreted as 10, 000 passengers. The costs of protecting / dis-
rupting a node (qni and p
n
i ) were drawn uniformly among the values {2, 4, 6}. These three
values were chosen to model stations of different size (small, medium and large). We also
assumed paj = 1. This choice was driven by the observation that in real life disrupting an
arc is usually easier than disrupting a station. Tracks, in fact, are highly vulnerable because
of their length and the presence of accessible and easily attackable structures (overpasses,
bridges, tunnels). Just hitting one of these structures would impair the full link. On the
other hand, the complete protection of a track can be an expensive task. Therefore, the
values qaj were chosen uniformly from the set {1, 2, ..., 6}.
One of the assumptions of our model is that there is a limit to the number of arcs and
nodes that can be disrupted. This budget limit is introduced to model disruptions of different
magnitude. For example, a small interdiction budget indicates that the disruptive event only
affects a few small components of the network. Conversely, a large disruption can affect a
larger number of elements of the network and/or big assets. In our analysis, we consider three
disruption scenarios. The interdiction resources associated with each scenario are shown in
Table 1. Specifically, we assume that a small event is able to interdict only a small station or
two arcs, whereas a large event is able to completely disrupt a big station or a combination
of small components. The protection budget is assumed to be a percentage α of the total
amount of resources needed to protect the full network, denoted byB. Namely, q|T | = αB. We
consider values of α equal to 5% and 10%. The protection resources are spread in a 5-period
planning horizon. The time periods are all weighted equally (λ = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2]).





The results for the two data sets are displayed in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
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Table 2: Computational comparison between BND-D and SVI-D for the 10-15-x networks
Network Disr units Prot Objective Computing time (sec) Prot Prot Disr Disr
name per period budget value BND-D SVI-D arcs nodes arcs nodes
10-15-1 2 5% 6886 0.52 0.01 1 0 6 2
2 10% 6414 0.75 0.05 1 1 8 1
4 5% 8513 0.59 0.05 1 1 18 1
4 10% 8179 8.01 0.89 2 1 20 0
6 5% 9992 0.64 0.03 1 1 9 5
6 10% 9516 7.39 0.70 1 3 22 2
10-15-2 2 5% 5336 0.61 0.04 1 1 6 2
2 10% 4884 4.26 0.36 2 1 8 1
4 5% 7782 0.94 0.09 2 1 16 2
4 10% 7449 66.79 2.02 4 1 16 2
6 5% 9126 1.77 0.41 2 1 26 2
6 10% 8829 > 10000 25.96 4 1 24 2
10-15-3 2 5% 5235 0.52 0.02 0 1 8 1
2 10% 4611 0.76 0.04 2 1 10 0
4 5% 7760 0.57 0.04 1 1 16 2
4 10% 7200 2.14 0.44 2 1 18 1
6 5% 9196 0.83 0.08 0 2 18 6
6 10% 8796 62.24 3.16 1 3 26 2
10-15-4 2 5% 5122 0.71 0.04 3 0 10 0
2 10% 4398 2.35 0.53 4 0 10 0
4 5% 7280 2.09 0.39 2 0 16 2
4 10% 6797 208.82 5.93 4 1 12 4
6 5% 8832 7.74 0.62 3 0 20 5
6 10% 8405 3479.83 33.82 4 1 16 6
10-15-5 2 5% 4642 0.52 0.02 1 0 10 0
2 10% 4270 0.83 0.08 1 1 8 1
4 5% 7270 0.74 0.05 1 1 14 3
4 10% 6892 12.47 0.61 2 2 18 1
6 5% 8811 1.43 0.43 1 2 22 4
6 10% 8385 144.07 7.81 2 2 28 1
AVG 7226.93 138.65 2.82 1.87 1.07 15.30 2.03
For each network, disruption scenario and protection budget level, the tables show the
DNP’s objective function values, i.e., the worst-case disrupted flow over the planning horizon,
the computing times of the two algorithms, and the number of network elements protected
and disrupted in the optimal solutions. In these initial tests, the threshold for the path choice
was fixed to 1, i.e., only the shortest paths are considered acceptable.
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Table 3: Computational comparison between BND-D and SVI-D for the 20-25-x networks
Network Disr units Prot Objective Computing time (sec) Prot Prot Disr Disr
name per period budget value BND-D SVI-D arcs nodes arcs nodes
20-25-1 2 5% 21807 2.28 0.11 2 0 10 0
2 10% 19367 204.54 1.68 4 1 8 1
4 5% 32436 1.89 0.16 2 0 4 4
4 10% 31257 > 10000 11.43 3 2 12 2
6 5% 37113 16.75 0.73 3 0 10 5
6 10% 36580 > 10000 232.22 3 2 26 1
20-25-2 2 5% 22773 1.05 0.03 1 1 8 1
2 10% 20241 20.15 1.11 4 1 8 1
4 5% 31581 12.27 0.56 2 1 14 3
4 10% 29370 9430.88 32.80 4 2 12 4
6 5% 36833 41.37 2.56 1 2 12 9
6 10% 35242 > 10000 1965.73 4 2 24 3
20-25-3 2 5% 24297 1.10 0.03 1 1 8 1
2 10% 21534 14.03 0.88 3 1 8 1
4 5% 32058 2.15 0.22 1 1 16 2
4 10% 30800 487.11 8.39 5 1 14 3
6 5% 37155 2.84 0.65 2 1 20 5
6 10% 35646 > 10000 128.42 5 1 18 6
20-25-4 2 5% 27102 1.15 0.06 1 1 8 1
2 10% 24255 21.37 0.64 3 1 8 1
4 5% 34934 2.06 0.17 1 1 18 1
4 10% 33105 853.55 9.52 4 1 12 4
6 5% 39368 5.87 0.96 2 1 18 6
6 10% 37842 > 10000 393.51 3 1 20 5
20-25-5 2 5% 27791 829.00 0.04 1 1 8 1
2 10% 26065 43.73 1.45 4 2 6 2
4 5% 36440 15.19 0.48 2 1 12 4
4 10% 34949 6093.55 11.99 4 2 8 6
6 5% 40817 82.36 1.82 1 2 24 3
6 10% 39344 > 10000 3444.29 4 2 24 3
AVG 31270.07 757.76 208.42 2.67 1.20 13.27 2.97
The tables clearly show that SVI-D outperforms BND-D in every case. This is mostly due
to the fact the RMP in the SVI-D approach does not have an objective function and, upon
solving it, one stops as soon as a feasible solution is identified. As a consequence, the RMPs
can be solved very quickly. The drawback is that without an objective to drive the protection
strategy selection, the algorithm takes a considerable number of iterations before converging
to an optimal solution. Conversely, finding a solution to each RMP in the BND-D algorithm
is quite time-consuming. Although this algorithm converges in a much smaller number of
iterations compared to SVI-D, this is not sufficient to offset the greater difficulty of solving
each RMP and its overall computing time is considerably higher.
The impact of the size of the network is evident by comparing the two tables. Nonetheless,
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the high variability in the computing time suggests that the complexity of the problem
depends on a combination of several factors, including the network topology. For instance,
networks 20-25-4 and 20-25-5, although of equal size, have very different computing times.
In Table 4, we report some additional results for the largest data set using different path
thresholds. The threshold value determines the number of acceptable paths, which in turn
affects the size of the problems in terms of number of variables and constraints. Table 4
shows the impact of three different threshold values on the number of available paths and the
computing time. A threshold value equal to 1.5 indicates that the users are willing to accept
a 50% increase on their normal travel time, before switching to other transportation services
or abandoning the trip. Similarly, a value equal to 2 indicates that a travel delay up to 100%
is considered acceptable. Given the superiority of SVI-D, the computing times are reported
for this algorithm only. In the analysis, we consider two protection levels (α = 5%, 10%) and
three disruption scenarios (2, 4, and 6 disruption units).
Table 4: Computational results for different path threshold values
Network Threshold Paths Computing time (sec.)
Protection level (α) 5% 10%
Disruption scenario (pt) 2 4 6 2 4 6
20-25-1 1 172 0.11 0.16 0.73 1.68 11.43 232.22
1.5 247 0.19 1.44 4.00 1.64 198.13 1684.57
2 327 0.18 4.66 6.29 3.86 114.65 1002.78
20-25-2 1 166 0.03 0.56 2.56 1.11 32.80 1965.73
1.5 229 0.07 0.60 3.95 1.35 25.40 2730.99
2 299 0.11 0.99 4.60 2.78 31.22 2469.20
20-25-3 1 172 0.03 0.22 0.65 0.86 8.39 128.42
1.5 220 0.04 0.97 1.23 0.74 28.25 543.99
2 317 0.04 1.04 4.02 1.75 41.19 1089.08
20-25-4 1 170 0.06 0.17 0.96 0.64 9.52 393.51
1.5 245 0.06 0.77 1.10 0.95 26.88 395.96
2 323 0.13 1.55 3.08 1.81 87.27 2587.95
20-25-5 1 175 0.04 0.48 1.82 1.45 11.99 3444.29
1.5 269 0.11 0.78 1.71 1.59 14.27 4183.99
2 331 0.26 0.75 6.18 1.91 24.76 1224.40
Although in most of the cases an increase in the path threshold value results in an
increase in computing time, there are some exceptions to this general trend, especially for
large instances (α = 10% and pt = 6). For these instances, the most critical threshold
value seems to be 1.5. As previously noted, these results point out that the performance of
the algorithms are influenced by an interaction of different elements, such as the protection
and disruption budgets, the network topological structure and the flow demand matrix. In
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general, increasing the number of acceptable paths increases the number of elements that
must be targeted to disrupt a flow. As a consequence, the interdiction problems may become
more difficult to solve. However, an increment in the path threshold value may also render
some flows too difficult or even impossible to disrupt, thus reducing the number of possible
interdiction plans and, consequently, the overall solution time.
To highlight how the path threshold affects the interdiction and protection optimal plans,
in Fig. 1 we compare the number of arcs and nodes protected and interdicted over the
planning horizon.
Figure 1: Impact of the path threshold on the number of protected/interdicted elements
(pt = 6,∀t, α = 10%).
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Changing the threshold value almost always results in different protection and interdiction
plans. In some cases the changes are small, in others can be significant. For example, consider
network 20-25-1. When the threshold is increased from 1 to 2, the number of interdicted arcs
drops from 26 to 10, whereas the number of nodes increases from 1 to 8. This indicates that
the interdiction plans are significantly different.
In summary, this analysis shows that changes to the path threshold parameter can have
significant effects on both the problem complexity and the optimal solutions. Consequently,
modeling users’ behavior accurately is a critical issue when solving this type of protection
models for service systems.
6 Case study analysis
In this section, we test the efficiency of the decomposition approaches and analyze the results
using a case study which represent the railway network of Kent (UK). The strategic position
of this county makes the case study particularly interesting. Kent has a nominal border
with France and, therefore, intercepts all the passenger flow from and to France. Although
most of the traffic flow is represented by London commuters, Kent’s railway has also a
considerable traffic of tourists, attracted by historical places like Canterbury and Rochester.
The overall network comprises 18 nodes, corresponding to cities and towns of the region,
and 22 undirected arcs. The actual railway network is more complex, having more nodes
and arcs. We simplified it by aggregating neighbouring stations and the corresponding flow
generated/attracted by them. A graphic representation of the network is showed in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Railway network in Kent (UK).
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In the absence of real flow data, we generated the flow matrix as a function of the dimen-
sion of the connected towns, and the frequency and capacity of the trains travelling on the
network. As in the computational result section, we assumed that disrupting an arc requires
one unit of resources (paj = 1). We also used the same assumption made for the protec-
tion/disruption of nodes: we divided the stations into three groups according to their annual
passenger usage (Table 5). For example, Battle which is a small touristic town with less than
half a million annual passengers, needs two units to be disrupted/protected. Differently,
Ashford, which is a town of considerable size with more than 2 million annual passengers,
requires six units. The number of protection units, qaj , needed to fully protect an arc depends
on the number of tunnels and bridges that can be found on that arc. These numbers are
displayed along the arcs in Fig. 2. The disruption scenarios are the same as the ones used
in the previous section (see Table 1).
Table 5: Resources needed to disrupt/protect a node
Node dimension Disr/Prot resources
Small (annual passengers < 0.5 M) 2
Medium (0.5 M ≤ annual passengers < 1.5 M) 4
Big (annual passengers ≥ 1.5 M) 6
To compute the acceptable paths, we choose a threshold value equal to 1.5 (i.e., increases
up to 50% of the normal travel time are considered acceptable). We focus on a 5-period
planning horizon. In our initial investigation each period is weighted equally.
6.1 Impact of protection investments
In this section, we analyse the impact that different levels of protection resources have on
the amount of flow loss, for different disruption scenarios.
Table 6: Percentage amount of flow loss for different disruption scenarios and protection budgets.
Scenario No protection 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10%
small 27.37% 25.38% 24.48% 24.48% 23.97% 23.21% 22.34%
medium 34.50% 34.11% 32.92% 32.65% 32.65% 31.51% 31.12%
large 41.24% 38.18% 37.93% 36.50% 36.23% 35.69% 34.77%
For each disruption scenario and protection budget level, Table 6 displays the worst-case
percentage flow loss when the optimal protection strategy for that scenario is implemented.
The results show that even a small disruption can result in a loss of traffic flow as high as
27.37% of the total traffic, if no protection is carried out. This suggests that the network under
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study is highly vulnerable: even small, but possibly frequent, disruptive events can affect a
significant portion of the flow. Obviously, the impact of disruption is more pronounced for
medium and large disruption scenarios, with a flow loss of 34.50% and 41.24%, respectively.
Investing in protection measures brings notable benefits. In particular, with a protection
investment equal to 10%, the worst-case percentage flow loss can be reduced by about 18%,
10% and 16% in the three scenarios.
Fig. 3 displays the marginal percentage decrease in flow loss, for each percent unit
increment in protection resources. This graph provides in depth information on how each
budget increment affects potential system losses. This analysis is useful to highlight the
trade-off between protection expenditures and flow loss reductions in case of disruption. As
an example, if small disruptions are considered, a 5% investment results in a worst-case
flow loss reduction of about 7% (first segment of the first bar in the chart). If protection
investments can be increased to 10%, the benefit is more than doubled with an overall flow
loss reduction of about 18%. The graph also highlights possible investment inefficiencies. For
example, for medium disruptive scenarios (second bar), increasing the budget form 7% to
8% has no impact on the worst-case flow loss, to denote that this added budget, although
optimally allocated, is insufficient to thwart any additional interdiction plan.
Figure 3: Marginal percentage decrease in flow loss due to unit increments of the protection budget.
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6.2 Uncertainty of disruption events
One of the main issues involved in infrastructure protection planning is the intrinsic uncer-
tainty of the disruption events. It is difficult and sometimes impossible to forecast when a
disruption will happen and what its magnitude will be. The aim of the protection planner
is to make the network as robust as possible, which means identifying a strategy that works
well in all the possible scenarios. To this end, we consider how the optimal solution found for
a given scenario, works if a different scenario occurs. The analysis is performed considering
five equally weighted time periods and a protection budget equal to 10% of the resources
needed to protect the full network. The results are shown in Table 7.
Table 7: Cross-comparison of different optimal protection plans. Relative percentage flow loss
increase.
Actual scenario MAX AVG
Supposed scenario small medium large
small 0% 4.3% 8.0% 8.0% 4.1%
medium 13.8% 0% 14.4% 14.4% 9.4%
large 12.7% 5.6% 0% 12.7% 6.1%
The table shows the percentage increase in unserved flow when an optimal strategy,
obtained with a fixed scenario (supposed scenario), is used in a different scenario (actual
scenario). The table also shows the maximum and the average increase across all different
scenarios. Both solutions obtained for medium and large disruptions can be highly sub-
optimal if a small disruption takes place, resulting in a flow loss increase of 13.8% and 12.7%,
respectively. The best solution, in terms of both maximum and average values, is the one
obtained for small disruptions. This seems to indicate that planning for a small disruption
is overall a more robust strategy for this railway network. Obviously, a thorough analysis of
this issue would require the development of more sophisticated optimization models, which
account for the probability of occurrence of different scenarios and explicitly incorporate
robustness measures (Snyder and Daskin, 2006).
6.3 Dynamic investments
When dynamic investments are considered, a key questions is whether to opt for a protection
strategy which renders the network as robust as possible at the end of the planning horizon,
or for a strategy which guarantees high levels of protection as soon as possible (although
this may decrease the overall efficiency of the final protection plan). In this subsection,
we investigate how the protection strategies change when the time periods are weighted
differently. Note that the weight λt associated with the time periods in the model objective
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has some similarity with the discount parameter used in economics, in that it can be used
to discount future losses. However, in economics, future values are usually discounted more
heavily. In our model, instead, the weights vary and higher values may be associated with
the last time period if the ultimate objective is to achieve maximum protection effectiveness
at the end of the planning horizon.
In our analysis, we consider three different cases:
− CASE 1: λ = [0.8, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05]. Here the aim of the protection planner is to
obtain a good level of protection from the very first time period.
− CASE 2: λ = [0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2]. Here all the periods are equally weighted.
− CASE 3: λ = [0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.05, 0.8]. Here the aim of the protection planner is to
maximise the safety level achieved when the protection strategy is fully implemented.
The protection budget used in this analysis is equal to 10% of the budget needed to protect
all the assets in the network.
Table 8: Impact of the time weights on the worst-case percentage flow loss.
CASE1 CASE2 CASE3
Scenario TL IL FL TL IL FL TL IL FL
Small 22.34% 26.40% 17.76% 22.34% 26.40% 17.76% 22.21% 27.01% 16.55%
Medium 31.12% 36.01% 28.10% 31.12% 36.01% 28.10% 31.51% 36.01% 27.86%
Large 34.77% 39.78% 30.90% 34.77% 39.78% 30.90% 34.77% 39.78% 30.90%
Table 8 has three columns for each case. The first one represents the total worst-case
percentage flow loss over all the time periods (TL). The second represents the worst-case
percentage flow loss in the initial time period (IL). The third represents the worst-case per-
centage flow loss in the final period (FL). This gives an indication of the protection level
reached by the network at the end of the planning horizon. The analysis is done for three
different disruption scenarios. Interestingly, the optimal protection strategy identified for
large disruptions is the same, independently on the weights used in the objective function.
Conversely, the other two scenarios present differences in the optimal protection strategies
when more importance is given to the last time period (the first two cases are still equal). For
small disruptions, giving more importance to the last period results in a more resilient final
network, with a drop of the worst-case flow loss from 17.76% to 16.55%. Also the total flow
loss slightly reduces from 22.34% to 22.21%. This indicates that aiming for the safest possible
network after 5 years also results in a more resilient network during the transitory periods
in which protections are implemented. For medium disruptions, the strategy to obtain a
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good level of protection in the last period results in higher losses of traffic (from 31.12% to
31.51%) throughout the planning horizon. Overall, for this case study, the weights given to
the different time periods do not seem to have a massive impact on the protection strategies
and on the network resiliency achieved at the end of the planning horizon.
6.4 Solution analysis
In this section we show a sample solution of the proposed model. In particular, Fig. 4
displays the assets chosen in the optimal protection plans, over the planning horizon, for
the three disruption scenarios. The protection budget is again equal to 10% of the budget
necessary to protect the entire network and all the time periods have equal weights.
It is clear that protecting the traffic to and from London is of strategic importance. In
fact, both the arcs connected to Swanley and Dartford are chosen for protection. Also some
arcs connected to Maidstone and Ashford are protected. These towns are among the most
populated in Kent and therefore generate and attract high volumes of traffic. It is also
interesting to notice that two relatively small stations like Otford and Strood are protected.
This is a consequence of their strategic position. They intercept the traffic to and from
London and are also directly connected to Maidstone. The main difference between the three
graphs is that when the extent of a possible disruption increases (Fig. 4c), more stations can
be disrupted. Consequently, more stations appear in the optimal protection strategy.
Finally, Fig. 5 shows the network components involved in a worst case disruption, after
the implementation of the optimal protection strategies displayed in Fig. 4. The interdiction
strategies follow a pattern similar to the one identified in the protection plans. The affected
components are, in fact, on the paths to and from London (link connected to Ebbsfleet), and
on the paths to big or touristic stations (Maidstone, Ashford, Canterbury and Hastings).
Table 9 provides the details of how the optimal protection strategies are implemented over
the planning horizon and, for each time period, displays the worst case interdictions. It can
be noticed that the three protection plans share several targets to protect. Nonetheless the
periods in which these targets are protected are usually different. Interestingly, in the second
time period no protection is implemented for the small disruption scenario. This is because
the resources available in this time period are saved to protect a larger asset (Maidstone-
Otford link) in the successive period. This table highlights how, in a real protection planning











Figure 5: Post-protection worst case losses in different disruption scenarios.
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Table 9: Optimal protection plans and worst case losses over the planning horizon.
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7 Conclusions and discussion
To protect critical infrastructure systems, it is necessary to distribute limited protection
resources in the most effective way. This paper introduced a bilevel fortification model to
identify the best allocation of protection resources against worst case scenario disruptions in
transportation networks. This model includes the important issue of considering dynamic
investments. Two decomposition methods to find optimal solutions to the model were pro-
posed and compared. The method based on super-valid inequalities clearly outperformed a
classic Benders decomposition approach in terms of computational efficiency. Our analysis
showed how the model results can be used to identify the optimal investment level to achieve
a desirable degree of protection, and highlighted possible trade-offs between protection ex-
penditures and traffic flow preserved in case of disruption. We applied the modeling approach
to the Kent railway network and showed the optimal protection strategies for different dis-
ruption scenarios (small, medium and large). For this particular case study, the weights given
to the different time periods in the objective of our dynamic model did not seem to have a
significant impact on the optimal protection plans.
Tests on some randomly generated problems indicated that a critical problem parameter
is the path threshold value. This parameter is used to model the users’ behavior and identify
the acceptable paths from a user perspective. A limitation of the current model is that each
origin-destination path is either acceptable or not. Given that the solutions identified by the
model are highly sensitive to the path threshold parameter, variations to this basic model
should be developed which better capture the users’ behavior. A logical extension would
be to consider that, following a disruption, the proportion of users taking a different path
depends on the extra travel time of this path, compared to the shortest one.
Other possible extensions of this work include the following. Other metrics, such as the
system costs, and the duration and frequency of a disruption, should be used to measure the
system’s performance. These aspects could be merged into a multi-objective model. Our
model only considers binary interdictions and protections. Future works may relax this as-
sumption by considering different levels of disruption/protection for each asset at different
costs. Protection models against random failures, as opposed to worst-case interdictions,
should also be developed and the protection strategies identified by the two modeling ap-
proaches should be compared. Finally, an interesting line of research would be to consider
scenario-indexed models including robustness measures. These models, which directly cap-
ture the intrinsic uncertainty of disruptive events, would be better suited to identify robust
solutions across different disruption scenarios.
In terms of methodology, adding a temporal component undoubtedly renders this type of
29
bilevel protection problems significantly more difficult to solve than their static counterparts.
The proposed solution approaches can only be applied to small/medium networks, such as
the one used in the Kent case study. Solving larger instances will require developing more
sophisticated approaches, including heuristics and hybrid approaches.
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